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OVERLAPPING INTERESTS IN DERIVATIVE
WORKS AND COMPILATIONS*
Copyright protection of derivative works and compilations raises
some compelling problems for the present scheme of copyright law.
At what point does the protection of a work undercut the protection
afforded another work? And at what point does the protection of a
work invade the public domain? This Note examines the unique
problems created by the admixture of original and preexisting ele-
ments in derivative works and compilations.
INTRODUCTION
A COPYRIGHTABLE1 derivative work or compilation will con-
tain at least two elements: preexisting materials or rights, which
are either in the public domain or protected by a prior author's
copyright, and original elements of the derivative work or compila-
tion that are protected by a separate copyright.2 This Note exam-
ines those instances in which the copyright protection afforded a
derivative work has the effect of protecting materials or rights
which either are already in the public domain or are protected by an
original3 author's copyright.
Section I of this Note begins with a brief history of develop-
ments in the law of copyright protection, with a special emphasis on
the original author's increasing right to control derivative uses of
his work.4 Concepts necessary for a more complete understanding
of the problems attending the copyright of derivative works also are
discussed. These include the notions of originality,5 infringement,6
and the idea-expression dichotomy.7
* First prize, Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law (sponsored by the American Society of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers (ASCAP)).
1. In this Note, the term "copyrightable" means that the work is original, and hence
capable of having its own copyright, distinct from the copyright in the original work.
2. See Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. CoPY-
RIGHT Soc'y 209, 243 (1983) (identifying three elements typically included in a derivative
work). See also infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
3. For the purpose of this Note, the term "original author" refers to the author of the
work upon whioh a derivative work or compilation is based. The term "original work" refers
to the work which was the basis of the derivative work or compilation.
4. See infra notes 36-78 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 62-83 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 84-99 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
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Section II discusses the protection of a compiler's research-
protection which enables a compiler to protect the expression of his
research labors,8 even though the components of his work are not
entirely original. Copyright may not be the most effective means of
protecting the interests of both an original author and a subsequent
compiler.9 This Note discusses unfair competition as an alternative
to copyright protection1" and also explores the interests of persons
whose access to preexisting materials may be blocked effectively by
a compiler's copyright." In this context, the fair use defense will be
discussed as a means of ensuring free access to preexisting
materials. 12
In Section III, the Note analyzes the competing interests present
when a derivative author transforms a preexisting work into a new
medium or alternative form. While an unlicensed derivative work
may infringe upon the original author's exclusive right to create de-
rivative works, 3 recognition of the original author's right does not
mean necessarily that all adaptations of his work to a new medium
must fall within the purview of his copyright. At the same time,
the originality standard compels protection of the derivative au-
thor's variations on the preexisting work. 14
Protection of compilations and derivative works serves copy-
right's important goals of protecting and encouraging original ex-
pressions. As copyright law evolves, the competing interests of
original and derivative authors will test the integrity of these goals.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTIONS
The Copyright Act of 1976"5 grants an author several exclusive
rights, including the right to reproduce his work1 6 in compilations 1
7
8. See infra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 131-44 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 145-67 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 18, 95.
14. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
15. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
16. Id. § 106(1).
17. A compilation is defined by the Act as a "work formed by the collection and assem-
bling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a
way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." Id.
§ 101. The preexisting material may, but need not, be copyrightable. H.R. REP. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5670. Thus,




* or otherwise, and to prepare derivative works18 based upon the orig-
inal work.19 The Act also grants a separate set of rights to deriva-
tive works and compilations,20 provided that they are original.21
The copyright in a derivative work or compilation, though, "ex-
tends only to the material contributed by the author of such work,
. . . and does not affect or enlarge. . . any copyright protection in
the preexisting [work]."22 Thus, copyright subsists only in what is
original to a derivative work or compilation, and not in any preex-
isting material.
The 1976 Act is the product of an increasing awareness that
copyright's primary objective is to protect authors, and thereby pro-
mote the public good.
A. Historical Background
The United States Constitution expressly provides for copyright
and patent laws "to promote the progress of science and useful
arts."23 The statement of copyright's purpose in the Constitution
indicates its two correlative functions. First, copyright encourages
authors to create and publish their works, by granting them a mo-
nopoly over the economic exploitation of their works.24 Second, it
ensures a constant source of new works for the public, 'which pro-
18. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982). A derivative work is defined by the Act as "a work based
upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatiza-
tion,. . . or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." Id.
§ 101. "[Ihe 'pre-existing work' must come within the general subject matter of copyright
. . . regardless of whether it is or was ever copyrighted." H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note
17, at 57.
19. Other exclusive rights granted by the Act include the right to distribute copies of the
work, the right to perform the work publicly, and the right to display the work publicly. 17
U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
20. Section 103 of the Copyright Act states in pertinent part:
The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations
and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in
which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such
material has been used unlawfully.
Id. § 103(a).
21. Id. § 102.
22. Id. § 103(b).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The copyright clause was barely discussed by the
Framers, showing a basic belief in the necessity of copyright. This is rather surprising, be-
cause the first British copyright statute, the Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1709), had been
enacted less than 90 years before. See infra note 37. One of the few contemporary sources
discussing the copyright clause stated: "The utility of this power will scarcely be ques-
tioned. . . . The public good fully coincides in both [copyright and patent], with the claims
of individuals. The States cannot separately make effectual provision for either. THE
FEDERALIST No. 43, at 294 (3. Madison) (M. Walter Dunne ed. 1901).
24. B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 74-75 (1967).
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motes thought, and assures that the works eventually will be free
for others to use to create further new works.25
The 1976 Act is the first United States copyright statute which
truly encourages the publication of new works. Under prior acts,
federal copyright operated only when a work was published; state
common law copyright virtually nullified the federal law's encour-
agement of publication, though, by protecting works prior to publi-
cation for an unlimited period of time.26 The 1976 Act preempts
common law copyright and, in contrast with earlier copyright stat-
utes, grants protection to a work from the time that it is created.27
Thus, the 1976 Act encourages an author to publish his work imme-
diately, so that he may realize its full economic value.
Encouraging the creation and publication of works obviously is
not an end in itself.2" The policy reasons behind the current copy-
right provisions are the same as those behind the first British copy-
right statute.2 9 Copyright protects public access to new
information, expressions, and ideas.3" This in turn promotes indi-
vidual thought, personal growth, and the development of society. 3,
The two purposes of copyright potentially conflict because of
the disparate interests that copyright attempts to promote: the cre-
ator's economic interest in monopolizing his work, and the public's
interest in the free flow of ideas.32
Copyright strikes a balance between these purposes, in part, by
limiting the subject matter of copyright. Copyright protects only
expression, not ideas, and is not intended, by its protections, to im-
pede the free flow of ideas.33 Copyright's limited duration ensures
25. Id.
26. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 17, at 130, 134. On the relationship between
federal and common law copyrights, see, e.g., Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment,
70 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 1000-03 (1970).
27. 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-302 (1982).
28. While it is possible that encouragement of the author's personal growth and devel-
opment is the main purpose of copyright, that may not be its only purpose. People would no
doubt continue to be creative in the absence of copyright protection. KAPLAN, supra note 24,
at 76.
29. Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1709).
30. B. KAPLAN, supra note 24, at 74-76.
31. Id.
32. Professor Goldstein has observed:
Complete vindication of the creator's economic interest would logically require that
the statutory monopoly be absolute. Likewise, the logic of full vindication of the
immediate public interest in free access would require that no statutory monopoly
at all be permitted. The copyright statute reflects a reasoned compromise between
these competing interests.
Goldstein, supra note 26, at 1006.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
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that the public will have access to expressions within a relatively
short period of time.34 On the other hand, copyright protection is
broad enough, and its duration is long enough, to ensure that the
author will make the effort because he will have sufficient opportu-
nity to obtain rewards for it.
Both the subject matter and the duration of copyright have been
broadened significantly through time." Developments in copyright
legislation evince an especially significant increase in the scope of
protection given to authors.
1. Acts of 1790 and 1870
The first United States copyright act36 reflected copyright's Brit-
ish heritage as protection for publishers37 by protecting only the
right to reproduce the work. 3' An author had no protection against
34. Id. §§ 302-304.
35. The 1790 Act protected only books, maps, and charts for a term of 14 years. Act of
May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831). In contrast, the 1976 Act protects "original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression. . . from which they can be
perceived . . . or otherwise communicated" for the life of the author plus 50 years. 17
U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 302 (1982).
36. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).
37. Copyright has its roots in the practices of the British Stationers' Company. In 1557,
Queen Mary chartered the Stationers' Company to "provide a suitable remedy against [the
printing of] seditious and heretical material." L. PATrERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 29 (1968). The stationers were granted broad powers to carry out the Crown's
wish to censor printed materials, including the power to impose penalties which resulted in
the loss of the right to print. Id. at 39.
Since the Crown's primary concern was with censorship, not ownership of "copy," the
stationers were free to develop their own rules concerning property rights in the books they
printed. Id. at 36. After initial licensing by the Queen's representative, id. at 37, the Com-
pany required its members to obtain an allowance to publish the work. Id. at 52. This allow-
ance was entered on the Company's register, id. at 52, and thereafter prevented any other
member of the company from printing the work. Id. at 43-44.
The stationers' copyright was entirely a publisher's right, not an author's. Id. at 65.
Although the author did have some rights as the initial owner of the manuscript, and by
common understanding with the stationers, id. at 64-77, he had virtually no control over his
work once he sold his manuscript. B. KAPLAN, supra note 24, at 5.
When the licensing provisions, and thus the justification for their monopoly, expired in
1695, id. at 6, the stationers unsuccessfully attempted to convince Parliament to continue
regulation of the book trade. L. PATTERSON, supra note 37, at 138-42. In desperation, they
changed tactics and argued, not for censorship, but for protection of property rights in books,
id. at 142, to prevent piracy which might discourage "Persons from writing Matters, that
might be of great Use to the Publick." Id. at 142 (quoting XV H.C. JOUR. 313 (1706)).
Parliament agreed with this rationale, and passed the Statute of Anne in 1709, fittingly enti-
tled "An act for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of printed books in the
authors, or purchasers, of such copies, during the times therein mentioned." 8 Anne, ch. 19.
38. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831). The act stated that the
author was to have "the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending"
his work.
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derivative uses of his work, such as abridgements 39  or
translations. °'
Under the 1790 Act, derivative works were considered to be
wholly new works, apart from the materials upon which they were
based. The courts took a very literal view of "copying" or repro-
duction; hence, anything short of stealing a work, word for word,
did not amount to infringement.4
The 1856 amendment to the 1790 Act recognized that copyright
protected authors, not publishers, by creating a right to perform a
dramatic work publicly.42 The expansion of protection to include
the right to perform a work forced courts to look beyond the literal
similarities between two works and to recognize that more general
similarities also could constitute infringement.43
The 1870 Act further expanded authors' rights to include those
of dramatization and translation.' The right to dramatize particu-
larly should be noted, as it is the first protection of an author's right
to transform his work into other media. This recognition made it
difficult to maintain the distinction between ideas and expressions,
the traditional, invisible line dividing what copyright would and
would not protect.45
The courts nevertheless maintained the idea/expression dichot-
39. Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497).
40. Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514).
41. In Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497), for instance,
the court clearly distinguished between a noninfringing abridgement and an infringing combi-
nation of extracts from a prior work. The former involved a significant amount of independ-
ent labor and judgment, and therefore could be considered a wholly new work, even "though
it may injure the original." Id. at 175.
42. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138. Professor Goldstein characterized this
act as "Itihe first great intellectual leap, auguring copyright's break from the confines of
.cop~es,' apd the eventual statutory expansion of derivative rights." Goldstein, supra note 2,
at 213.
43. Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3,552) epitomizes the
courts' new approach. Rather than looking for literal similarities between the two plays in-
volved in the action, the Daly court instead looked to more general similarities in the se-
quence of events and of emotions created by the two works:
[I]t is a piracy, if the appropriated series of events, when represented on the stage,
although performed by new and different characters, using different language, is
recognized by the spectator. . . as conveying substantially the same impressions to,
and exciting the same emotions in, the mind, in the same sequence and order.
Id. at 1138. Thus, even though there were few literal similarities between the two plays, the
court found that performance of the defendant's play would infringe upon the plaintiff's per-
formance rights. Id.
44. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 320, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212.
45. B. KAPLAN, supra note 24, at 32.
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omy, justifying the right to dramatize under the necessary and
proper clause:
The law confines itself to a particular, cognate and well known
form of reproduction. If to that extent a grant of monopoly is
thought a proper way to secure the right to the writings this
court cannot say that Congress was wrong.46
2. Acts of 1909 and 1976
The 1909 Act further extended copyright protections to include
an author's right to abridge his work (as well as to translate and to
dramatize it), and "to make any other version thereof."'47 This Act
made apparent the change in thinking about derivative rights.
Under prior acts, derivative rights were treated as ad hoc exceptions
to the general rule that copyright protects only the right to
reproduce.48 The 1909 Act, in contrast, treated derivative works as
variants of the original, not as wholly separate works.49 Clearly,
more than "form" was being protected. 50
The 1976 Act extended the right to prepare derivative works to
any copyrightable work, not just to literary works as the 1909 Act
had done." This extension brought copyright around a full 180
degrees from its beginnings as a protection of copies for publishers
to a protection of content for authors.52
The 1976 Act is an attempt to balance the author's rights in his
creation against the interests of a subsequent author who makes use
of the first author's work. Derivative works and compilations con-
tinue to be separately copyrightable under the 1976 Act, as they
were under the 1790 Act.53 Their copyright is limited, however, by
the original author's rights to reproduce his work and to prepare
derivatives. Section 103(b) distinguishes between the original au-
thor's and the compiler's or derivative author's copyrights, ex-.
tending protection "only to the material contributed by the author"
of the derivative work or compilation, 4 and not to any portion of
46. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63 (1911) (Holmes, J.).
47. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(b), 353 Stat. 1075. The Act goes on to state that
these rights only apply to "literary works."
48. The 1870 Act stated that "authors may reserve the right to dramatize or to translate
their own works." Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 320, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (emphasis added).
49. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
50. Note, Derivative Works and the Protection of Ideas, 14 GA. L. Rav. 794, 798 (1980).
51. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982); see supra note 47 and accompanying
text.
52. Note, supra note 50, at 799.
53. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1982).
54. Id. § 103(b) states:
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the underlying work. The two copyrights are to be
"independent.""5
Section 103(a) declares that copyright protection will "not ex-
tend to any part of the [derivative work or compilation] in which
[preexisting] material has been used unlawfully. ' 56 This precludes
copyright protection even for original portions of the derivative
work or compilation in which the preexisting work is used without
a license.57
Section 103 confines copyright protection to those portions of a
derivative work or compilation which are themselves original; to
the extent that preexisting work underlies the original work of the
derivative author or compiler, he must be licensed to use it. By
limiting protection to what is original in a derivative work or com-
pilation, copyright encourages the production of original material, a
result that comports with copyright's overriding purpose "to pro-
mote the progress of. . .useful Arts."58
B. Conceptual Background
The originality requirement, 9 infringement,6" and the
idea/expression dichotomy6 are related concepts which are applied
to determine whether and to what extent a work will be protected.
1. Originality
For a work to obtain copyright protection, it must be original.
The 1976 Act was the first of the copyright statutes to recognize the
originality requirement explicitly,62 although prior to enactment of
The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material
contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting mate-
rial employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting
material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or
enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection
in the preexisting material.
55. Id.
56. Id. § 103(a).
57. Whether a work is excluded from copyright protection is determined by the nature
of the compilation or derivative work. If the preexisting work underlies the entire derivative
or compilation, then the derivative or compilation is totally unprotected. An example of this
is an unauthorized translation. However, if the preexisting work underlies only a small part
of the derivative or compilation, only that portion of the derivative or compilation is unpro-
tected. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 17, at 57-58.
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
59. See infra notes 62-83 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 84-99 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
62. "Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of authorship ....... 17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
[V'ol. 35:103
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the statute, courts had incorporated this concept into copyright
analysis. The House Report on the Act indicates that Congress in-
tended to bring the concept as applied by the courts into the new
statute.63
Originality is the threshold requirement for copyright protec-
tion. It requires neither skill nor creativity. It merely requires that
the work contain some expressive element which is not copied from
a preexisting work. 64 The expressive elements, however, must be
more than "trivial., 6 ' The courts have refused to apply any re-
quirement of artistic merit, recognizing that the existence of copy-
right protection must be based on something other than the tastes
and aesthetic predispositions of particular judges. Thus, the appli-
cation of the originality standard results in protection of a broad
array of works, including advertisements 6 6 and lamps67 under cer-
tain circumstances.
Originality under copyright law does not require novelty, as pat-
ent law does. A work may be precisely the same as a preexisting
work, but still claim copyright protection because it was indepen-
dently conceived.6 8 Thus, the ultimate test of originality is that the
work must originate with the author, without conscious, or perhaps
even unconscious, 69 reference to prior works.
70
a. Triviality. As stated above, the new, expressive element
must be more than trivial to entitle a work to copyright protec-
tion.7' One test defines a trivial change as one that is merely
mechanical, such as anyone might do.72 A similar test defines trivi-
63. "The phrase 'original works of authorship' . . is intended to incorporate without
change the standard of originality established by the courts . H.R. REP. No. 1476,
supra note 17, at 51.
64. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903); Alfred Bell &
Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
65. See, ag., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir.
1951).
66. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
67. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
68. "[I]fby some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats'
Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author,' and if he copyrighted it, others might not
copy that poem, though they might of course copy Keats'." Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn
Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
69. Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. Supp. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
70. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
71. See, eg., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir.
1951).
72. See, eg., Grove Press, Inc. v. Collector's Publications, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 603, 605
(C.D. Cal. 1967) (holding that 40,000 changes in spelling, punctuation, and grammar were
"trivial," because they were changes that "any high school graduate" could make).
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ality as the exercise of only physical, as opposed to artistic, skill.7 3
A third test defines a trivial variation as one that is insubstantial;74
this test seeks to define triviality through a synonym, and thus for-
sakes certainty for circularity.75
The purpose of requiring that variations be more than trivial is
to allow copyright protection for the most minimal contributions,
but to draw the line at variations so minor that protection of them
would harass authors more than promote "the useful arts."76
Although the policy justification for the triviality test is clear, the
obscurity of this test is nonetheless a burden on the courts.7 7
b. Skill, Judgment, and Effort. A second test for the level of
originality necessary to gain copyright protection examines the
amount of skill, judgment, or effort expended to produce a work,
rather than its distinction from prior works.7" A highly skillful, ex-
act replica of a prior work thus may be protected.79 Similarly, the
exercise of judgment in the selection and/or arrangement of com-
piled materials may also be protected.80 Some courts even go so far
as to hold that the sheer amount of effort involved in creating a
73. See, e.g., L. Batlin & Sons, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.) (holding that a
plastic reproduction of an antique "Uncle Sam" bank, long in the public domain, was not
copyrightable because it displayed merely "manufacturing skill"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857
(1976).
74. See, e.g., Andrews v. Guenther Publishing Co., 60 F.2d 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
75. In trying to refine the standard, courts used such phrases as "a modicum of creative
work," id. at 557, or "merely a colorable attempt to use someone else's work," Northern
Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), to define
the necessary degree of variation.
76. "There comes a point where the use of material is so close as not to give the public
anything really new. At that point, the ideal of encouraging independent creation ceases to
operate." Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: 1, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 514
(1945).
77. See, e.g., Oppenheimer, Originality in Art Reproductions: "Variations" in Search of a
Theme, 27 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 207 (1982); Note, Arrangements and Editions of
Public Domain Music: Originality In a Finite System, 34 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 104 (1983);
Note, Copyright-Originality-Confusing the Standards for Granting Copyrights and Patents,
79 W. VA. L. REV. 410 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Confusing the Standards].
78. Professor Nimmer has noted that there seems to be a "reciprocal relationship" be-
tween the amounts of creativity and effort required to meet the originality requirement; the
more effort that is involved in creating a work, the less creativity must be shown, and vice
versa. 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.04 (1984).
79. Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (reduced-scale
replica of public domain statue found to be original because of the great amount of skill
needed to reproduce the work so precisely).
80. The originality of such works was recognized as far back as Story v. Holcombe, 23
F. Cas. 171, 174 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497) ("In [a compilation] the judgment may be
said to be exercised to some extent in selecting and combining the extracts. Such work enti-
[Vol. 35:103
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work may entitle it to protection. 8'
Once a work is found to be original, it is entitled to copyright
protection for all that is original to it.82 Such protection includes
the right to prepare derivatives and to reproduce the work. Thus, if
the original work is a derivative, the author may create further de-
rivatives for the original portions of his work. 3
2. Infringement
The test for whether one work infringes upon the copyright in
another is whether the two works are "substantially similar."
84
Substantial similarity generally is treated as a two-part test: first,
the allegedly infringing work must copy the other work, and sec-
ond, it must appropriate the other work's expression. 5
The first part of the test is met by showing that the alleged in-
fringer copied the prior work in creating his work. Copying is often
proved by showing that the alleged infringer had access to the prior
work, and that the two works are substantially similar.86 For exam-
ple, proof that the alleged infringer possessed the prior work (ac-
cess) and that his work contained the same typographical errors as
the prior work (substantial similarity) would probably be enough to
establish that he copied the prior work.87
Even if the alleged infringer copied the prior work, he did not
infringe unless he took the prior author's expression. This classic
distinction between an unprotectible idea and its protectible expres-
sion is discussed in the following subsection. 8 Suffice it to say that
the distinction lies in the difference between the form that a work
finally takes and the underlying structure upon which it is built.
ties the compiler, under the statute, to a right of property."). It is also specifically recognized
under the 1976 Act. 17 U.S.C. § 101, quoted supra note 17.
Where the nature of the preexisting material directs the form of the arrangement, such an
arrangement may not be protectible. See, eg., Norman v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., 333 F. Supp. 788 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); see also Taylor, The Uncopyrightability of Historical
Matter: Protecting Form Over Substance and Fiction Over Fact, 30 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP.
(ASCAP) 35, 39-42 (1983).
81. See, eg., Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950); Adventures
in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1942); Leon v. Pacific
Tel. & Tel., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937).
82. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (1982):
83. Id. § 106(2).
84. See, e-g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
85. Id. at 468.
86. See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nationwide Indep. Dir. Serv., Inc., 371 F.
Supp. 900 (W.D. Ark. 1974).
87. Id.
88. See infra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
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While an author cannot prevent others from taking his general
themes or characters,89 he can protect the more specific elements of
his work.90
Under the copying half of the infringement analysis, the court
looks to external, individual factors like typographical errors, stylis-
tic similarities, or similarities in plot. Under the appropriation half
of the test, however, the court must look to more subjective and
generalized elements. This second part of the test asks whether the
"casual" or "ordinary" observer would find that the two works
were substantially the same, and would tend to overlook the differ-
ences between them.91
The functions of the originality requirement and the infringe-
ment standard must be distinguished. Originality is the minimum
requirement for obtaining copyright protection. As such, the origi-
nality requirement should be very flexible and easy to meet, to en-
sure that copyright performs its basic function of encouraging
authors to create and publish their works. 92 The infringement stan-
dard, however, determines how much of a work will be protected,
and concomitantly, how much will be free for others to use. Proof
of infringement should be more difficult, because the protection it
gives to authors may impede the free flow of information and
ideas.93
Derivative works and compilations may infringe the copyright
in prior works and nonetheless be original. A derivative work will,
by definition, be based upon one or more preexisting works.94 Un-
less such a work is licensed, it may infringe upon the copyright in
the preexisting work.95 However, it may also contain wholly origi-
89. See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. de-
nied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). In Nichols, Judge Hand scrupulously assumed that everything
about plaintiff's play was wholly original, and nevertheless found that the defendant's use of it
was not an infringement, because he had taken only the most generalized abstractions from
the plaintiff's themes and characters. He thus had taken only the plaintiff's ideas, not her
expression. Id. at 122.
90. See id. at 121 ("But we do not doubt that two plays may correspond in plot closely
enough for infringement .... Nor need we hold that the same may not be true as to the
characters .... ).
91. See, e.g., Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir.
1960).
92. See Note, Confusing the Standards, supra note 77, at 411.
93. See generally id. at 420-21 (arguing that a strict standard of originality fails to recog-
nize the minimal amount of protection actually given to derivative works).
94. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Recall, however, that a compilation need not be "based
upon" prior works; it may consist of a collection of uncopyrightable material. See supra note
17.
95. The term "based upon" may encompass uses which are not infringements, however.
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nal elements which are themselves entitled to copyright. The casual
observer may tend to overlook the differences, but if they are not
trivial they may be sufficient to justify a separate copyright. 96
Nonetheless, the originality and infringement standards are re-
lated. Infringement will be found only if there is a taking of the
author's expression; there is no infringement if the copied portions
of the work were not original to it.97
Section 103(b) explicitly applies these standards to derivative
works and compilations. A derivative work or compilation is enti-
tled to protection under this provision only for what is original to it,
and its copyright is not to affect or enlarge the scope, duration, or
ownership of copyright in the underlying work.98 The copyright in
the derivative work or compilation thus cannot cover the preexist-
ing material upon which it is based. 99
The derivative work may take only ideas from the original work, but nonetheless be "based
upon" the original work. See B. KAPLAN, supra note 24, at 56-58; Goldstein, supra note 2, at
218-26.
96. See Note, Confusing the Standards, supra note 77, at 420-21.
97. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 78, § 3.04, at 3-15.
98. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1982). Allowing the derivative author's copyright to protect
materials covered by the original author's copyright would affect the scope of protection
given to the original work. For example, if the derivative work passed into the public do-
main, the elements protected by its copyright would pass with it. The original author's right
to control subsequent uses of his work would then be diminished, to the extent that he could
not control others' use of his work as it appeared in the derivative work.
If elements protected by the original author's copyright were also protected by the deriva-
tive author's copyright, the derivative author would presumably be entitled to reproduce
those elements and to create further derivatives based upon them. Once again, the original
author's right to control the uses made of his work would be diminished. See 1 M. NIMMER,
supra note 78, § 3.07[A]. But see Comment, Copyright-Infringement-Photocopy of Dedi-
cated Translation Constitutes Infringement of Underlying Work-Grove Press, Inc. v. Green-
leaf Publications Co., 247 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), 79 HARV. L. REV. 1716, 1719
(1966) (arguing that the first scenario is the necessary result of the derivative work passing
into the public domain, and that the second could be prevented by court rule).
The duration of the copyright protection in the underlying work would be similarly af-
fected because the copyright terms for the underlying work and the derivative works are not
coterminous. If the copyright in the derivative work expires before the copyright in the origi-
nal, others may be able to use the original work as it appears in the derivative before the
copyright expires in the original work itself.
Finally, ownership of copyright would be affected by granting the derivative author copy-
right protection for the preexisting material he used. Before the derivative work was created,
only the original author would have had any copyright protection in the underlying work, but
both the original and the derivative authors would have a copyright in some portions of the
underlying work after the derivative was created.
99. Contra Goldstein, supra note 2, at 243; Jaszi, When Works Collide: Derivative Mo-
tion Pictures, Underlying Rights, and the Public Interest, 28 UCLA L. REV. 715, 807-12
(1981).
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3. Idea/Expression Dichotomy
Copyright will protect only the author's expression of an idea,
and not the idea itself."° The line is an easy one to draw for so-
called "practical works." An idea, such as a system of account-
ing 10  or the rules of a game, 10 2 is not protected, but the expres-
sion-the description given by the author-is protected. Thus, one
may use the system of accounting or the rules of the game with
impunity, but may not copy the author's description of them.1 3
Attempts to apply the idea-expression dichotomy to other kinds
of works, though, quickly become vexatious. While expression
clearly includes more than form,"° it is not clear just where expres-
sion ends, and idea begins. 105
Because ideas and expressions have been so difficult to extricate,
it has been suggested that the dichotomy should be ignored, and
that the courts should recognize that copyright does protect ideas to
a limited extent. 106 Some courts have chosen to limit the scope of
the protection given to works whose ideas and expressions are inter-
twined so inextricably that protecting the expression would prevent
others from using the idea. 107 Given that the copyright clause and
the first amendment require that only expressions be protected,10 8
100. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) ("[A]
copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expres-
sion of the idea-not the idea itself.").
101. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (where the Court saw copyright as protecting
only the author's description of a bookkeeping system).
102. Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1945).
103. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. at 102-04; Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d at
513.
104. Note, supra note 50, at 798.
105. Judge Learned Hand's oft-quoted explanation of the problem bears repetition:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increas-
ing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out ...
[B]ut there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer pro-
tected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to
which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended. Nobody has
ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (citations omitted), cert
denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). See also Note, supra note 50, at 804-09, which gives several
examples of cases in which the trial and appellate courts came to opposite conclusions based
only upon different notions of where to draw the line between idea and expression.
106. Note, supra note 50, at 812. "Where the idea is not easily extricable from the ex-
pression, the idea-expression dichotomy provides no guidance for the identification of the
protectable as opposed to the non-protectable elements." Id. at 800.
107. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Honora Jewelry Co., Inc., 509 F.2d 64 (2d Cir.
1974); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
108. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 78, §§ 1.08[D], 1.10.
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and that ideas remain in the public domain, the latter view seems to
be more consistent with the basic tenets of copyright.
II. You CANNOT "COPY THE COPY"10 9
A compilation consists of at least two elements. First, it con-
tains preexisting materials, such as the names and addresses in a
telephone directory, or the individual poems or stories in an anthol-
ogy. Second, a compilation contains its original selection or ar-
rangement of the preexisting materials. In addition, many
compilations contain other original expressions, such as originally
expressed evaluations of the materials presented, or even original
expressions of the preexisting materials themselves, apart from the
selection or arrangement.
In addition to protecting the original expressions, copyright cur-
rently may protect the preexisting materials in a compilation. Thus,
a subsequent compiler may be precluded from using the first com-
piler's research and efforts. In Leon v. Pacific Telephone & Tele-
graph,10 the court held that the defendant's use of the plaintiff's
telephone directory to create a numerical listing of telephone num-
bers constituted an infringement on the plaintiff's copyright in the
directory. The court did not rely upon the originality of the plain-
tiff's selection and arrangement of data in finding that the defend-
ant's use infringed."1' Rather, it found that the defendant had
infringed because he had appropriated the plaintiff's labor and ex-
109. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903). Many of the
cases allowing copyright protection for the preexisting material contained in a compilation
drew this phrase out of context and used it as support for their holdings. See, e.g., C.S.
Hammond & Co. v. International College Globe, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 206, 218 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
The issue in Bleistein was the originality of photographs. The defendant argued that
photographs were not original because they merely copied reality. The Court held that
photographs were nevertheless expressive, and so, while one might go back and copy the
reality, one could not copy the photographs' depiction of reality. The Bleistein Court was
thus protecting the photographer's expression.
In the compilation cases, however, the protection is extended to the preexisting materials,
not to the compiler's expression. See infra notes 110-17. Thus Bleistein provides no support
whatever.
110. 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937).
111. There is, however, some indication that the court believed that the defendant's direc-
tory was an infringement of the plaintiff's right to prepare derivatives from its directory. In
response to the defendant's claim of fair use, the court stated that although the infringing
work served a different market than the plaintiff's, it was not necessarily a fair use: "The
inversion, without license, is not permitted merely because the holder of the copyright has not
so used it." Id. at 487.
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pense in compiling the data. 112
The court in Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co.'11 granted similar
protection for the gathering of historical data. In her biography of
Hans Christian Andersen, the plaintiff translated several letters that
had never before appeared in print. The defendant quoted these
letters in her biography of Andersen. 1 4 In finding that these quota-
tions were an infringement, the court did not rely on the originality
of the plaintiff's translations, although it might have. Instead, it
found that the defendant had made "substantial and unfair use" of
the plaintiff's work by using the plaintiff's research rather than do-
ing her own.'1 5
The courts in these cases have explained that the previous com-
piler has no copyright in the preexisting material itself." 6 Thus, if
the subsequent compilers went back to the original sources, they
would be free to use the material. But, the courts have held that
subsequent compilers cannot copy the material from a prior compi-
lation, and thereby "reap the benefits"' 17 of a previous author's la-
bor and effort.
A. Original Expressions and the Scope of Protection
The originality requirement sets a low threshold for copyright
protection, requiring only that the work "originate" with the au-
thor. " 8 A telephone directory can meet this standard with as much
ease as a more elaborate biography or novel.
It is clear, however, that the preexisting works or data that the
compiler uses are not original to him. They existed prior to his
expression of them, and so, as to these discrete elements, he cannot
claim origination." 9
Some courts have attempted to distinguish between the preexist-
ing materials and the research involved in discovering those materi-
112. Id. at 485-86.
113. 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950).
114. Id. at 666.
115. Id. at 667. The court was especially concerned about the time that the defendant
had saved by using the plaintiff's work rather than doing her own research.
116. See, e.g., Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809,
812-13 (7th Cir. 1942).
117. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 78, § 3.04.
118. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
119. Taylor, supra note 80, at 34-36; 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 78, § 2.01[A].
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als. The trial court in Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc.' found
that research was a creative endeavor, analogous more "to the ex-
pression of the facts than to the facts themselves."1 ' It instructed
the jury that copyright protects research but not facts.' The ap-
pellate court, however, held that protection of research was tanta-
mount to protection of the facts themselves, and therefore refused
to allow copyright protection for research.
12 3
To some extent, copyright does reward the exercise of effort; the
originality requirement attests to that. But copyright does not pro-
tect intellectual endeavors which have not been reduced to some
tangible medium. 124 The activity of fact-gathering is not protected;
copyright protection only exists when the research is compiled and
given a tangible form.
Of course, the compiler can protect his expression, i.e., his selec-
tion and arrangement of the materials he finds.'2 5 The subsequent
compiler may use the same materials, but may not copy a previous
compiler's expression.
126
Nevertheless, protection of an author's research might serve a
dual function. It would encourage authors to engage in research by
assuring them that others would not be able to appropriate the re-
sult of their efforts.' 27 It would also discourage subsequent compil-
120. 460 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd and remanded, 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir.
1981).
In Miller, the plaintiff's novel, 83 Hours Till Dawn, was a true story about a kidnapping in
which the victim was buried alive for five days. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had
copied the facts from the novel in creating its movie, The Longest Night. Id. at 985-86.
121. Id. at 987.
122. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d at 1368.
123.
The valuable distinction in copyright law between facts and the expression of
facts cannot be maintained if research is held to be copyrightable. There is no ra-
tional basis for distinguishing between facts and the research involved in obtaining
facts. To hold that research is copyrightable is no more or no less than to hold that
the facts discovered as a result of research are entitled to copyright protection.
Id. at 1372.
124. See supra notes 65-83 and accompanying text.
125. "A copyright in a directory. . . is properly viewed as resting on the originality of
the selection and arrangement of the factual material, rather than on the industriousness of
the efforts to develop the information." Miller at 1369, citing 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 78,
§ 3.04. See, e.g., Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809
(7th Cir. 1942).
126. Cf Millworth Converting Corp. v. Slifka, 276 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1960) (plaintiff
copied public domain embroidery, creating three-dimensional effect on fabric; defendant cop-
ied the public domain pattern from plaintiff, but did not copy the embroidery effect; held not
to be infringement).
127. Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76
HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1585-86 (1963); Taylor, supra note 80, at 49.
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ers from depending upon the original compiler's work, forcing them
to return to the original sources. Society would benefit from this
because the total body of knowledge in the area would increase, and
there would be a built-in check on the accuracy and currency of the
information given to the public. 2 '
On the other hand, forcing the later compiler to ignore prior
works in his field is both unrealistic 129 and unwise because it would
be unlikely to promote accuracy or to prevent duplication of ef-
fort.131 In addition, the copyright protection for the compiler's se-
lection of the preexisting materials would prevent wholesale
copying, and would encourage others to create more accurate and
better-organized compilations.
B. Unfair Competition
The danger in using copyright to protect the compiler's research
is that the protection afforded goes too far, protecting not only
against competitive uses but also against noncompetitive ones as
well. Futhermore, the duration of the standard copyright protec-
tion is much longer than is necessary to protect the author's ability
to compete. The unfair competition law offers an alternative
method of protecting the compiler's economic interest in his
research.
The unfair competition doctrine originally was developed to
prevent a manufacturer from passing off another manufacturer's
product as his own, deceiving or confusing consumers as to the
product's source. The court in International News Service v. Associ-
ated Press"' extended this doctrine into an area analogous to copy-
right. The court enjoined International News Service (I.N.S.) from
using Associated Press' (A.P.) uncopyrighted news dispatches to
compete with it on the west coast. Although the news itself was not
protectible, the court held that I.N.S., by tapping A.P.'s resources
to compete against it, had appropriated A.P.'s facilities for gather-
ing information. In the court's view, this amounted to "unfair com-
petition." 13 2 Thus, it transmuted a misrepresentation theory into a
128. Gorman, supra note 127, at 1585.
129. "[I]t is both customary and reasonable for biographers to refer to and utilize earlier
works" because it encourages the development of historical knowledge. Rosemont Enter.,
Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 336 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009
(1967).
130. B. KAPLAN, supra note 24, at 59 (citing Gorman, supra note 127, at 1570).
131. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
132. Id. at 239-40.
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* misappropriation theory. 133
Some state courts have used a similar analysis to find that a de-
fendant has usurped the market value of the product of the plain-
tiff's labor and expense. For example, in Madison Square Garden
Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., Inc.,134 the defendant's motion pic-
ture contained a fictional account of a professional hockey game in
New York City. Several scenes appeared to have been filmed at
Madison Square Garden, and to have shown games being played by
the New York Rangers, a hockey team then owned by Madison
Square Garden. In addition, the defendant had distributed a circu-
lar promoting the film which frequently referred to Madison Square
Garden. The owners had not authorized the defendant to use the
facilities or the hockey team in the film. The court found that the
plaintiff had developed a lucrative business in licensing photographs
of Madison Square Garden for use in motion pictures, and that the
defendant's "evident purpose. . . was to appropriate the financial
value [that Madison Square Garden and the Rangers] had acquired
through the plaintiff's labor, expenditure and skill." '135
The major difficulty with the misappropriation doctrine is that it
may run afoul of the preemption provision of the 1976 Act.
1 36
Under section 301, two elements are necessary to find that a state
133. Although LN.S. was a pre-Erie, federal common law decision, it has value as a
model for state protection of labor and effort. A.P. was protected against competitors who
might tap its resources and decrease the commercial value of its newspapers. The protection
would last only as long as the news had commercial value to A.P. 248 U.S. at 239-40. Pre-
sumably, a use of A.P.'s facilities which did not compete with A.P.'s use would not be pre-
vented. Thus, by analogy, the concern about others "reaping the benefits" of an author's
research would be met without requiring unnecessary duplication of effort or unnecessarily
preventing those not in competition with the compiler from gaining access to information.
134. 255 A.D. 459, 7 N.Y.S. 2d 845 (1938).
135. Id. at 467, 7 N.Y.S. 2d at 852. See also Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982); American Television and Communications Corp. v.
Manning, 651 P.2d 440 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols
Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1950), afl'd mer., 279 A.D. 632, 107
N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951); cf Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)
(allowing protection for a performer's "right of publicity").
136. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). The Act reads:
(a) [AII legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of
authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the
subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103 . . .are governed
exclusively by this title . ..
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the com-
mon law or statutes of any State with respect to-
(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of copy-
right... ; or. ..
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright. . ..
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cause of action is preempted by the federal copyright law. First, the
state cause of action must protect rights generally equivalent to
those protected by copyright. Second, the state cause of action
must protect works within the general subject matter of copyright.
A work lies outside the subject matter of copyright when it is
not an expression in a tangible medium.'37 Lack of originality is not
sufficient to take a work outside the general subject matter of copy-
right, 138 nor is it enough that the work partially consists of un-
copyrightable material. 139  Without such large scope provisions,
states would be able to encroach upon the domain of federal
legislation. °
The majority of courts considering the misappropriation theory
have found that it has been preempted.14 If the work is within the
general subject matter of copyright, the courts have found that the
rights protected by the misappropriation theory are equivalent to
those protected by copyright, because both a copyright and a misap-
propriation claim would require proof of copying. 42
The legislative history of section 301, recognizes, however, that
" 'misappropriation' is not necessarily synonymous with copyright
infringement."' 43 The courts' approach fails to recognize that both
a copyright and a misappropriation claim allege that the defendant
has taken different elements of the plaintiffs work. While copyright
protects the expressive elements in a work, misappropriation in this
context protects the nonexpressive elements: the plaintiff's invest-
ment of labor, skill, and effort to locate information.'" If, however,
137. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 17, at 131; see also Comment, The Evolution of the
Preemption Doctrine and its Effect on Common Law Remedies, 19 IDAHo L. REV. 85, 102-03
(1983).
138. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 17, at 131.
139. Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enter., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1983).
140. "Were this not so, states would be free to expand the perimeters of copyright protec-
tion . . . on the theory that preemption would [not bar] state protection of material not
meeting federal statutory standards." 723 F.2d at 200.
141. Comment, supra note 137, at 110.
142. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Penton Indus. Publishing Co., 486 F. Supp. 22, 26 (N.D. Ohio
1979); Schuchart & Assoc., Professional Eng'rs, Inc. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928,
944 (W.D. Tex. 1982).
143. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 17, at 132.
[A] cause of action labelled as "misappropriation" is not preempted if it is in
fact based neither on a right within the general scope of copyright . . . nor on a
right equivalent thereto. For example, state law should have the flexibility to afford
a remedy (under traditional principles of equity) against a consistent pattern of un-
authorized appropriation by a competitor of the facts (i.e., not the literary expres-
sion) constituting "hot" news . . ..
Id. (emphasis added).
144. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 78, at § 1.01[B][2][b]("[T]he limitations of the Copy-
[Vol. 35:103
OVERLAPPING INTERESTS
the plaintiff contends that the defendant has gained a competitive
advantage by taking the plaintiff's expression rather than creating
his own expression,1 45 then copyright and misappropriation would
be protecting "equivalent" rights, and the misappropriation claim
would be preempted.146
C. Fair Use
An increasing number of courts have used the fair use doctrine
to avoid giving excessive protection to compilers when the material
taken by a subsequent compiler is within the scope of the prior com-
piler's copyright.
The 1976 Act is the first of the copyright statutes to recognize
fair use.' 47 Congress indicated that it wanted only to recognize the
common law doctrine, without limiting the evolution of the com-
mon law.'
48
Fair use, an exception to the exclusive monopoly granted by
copyright, allows "others than the owner of a copyright to use the
copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without [the copyright
owner's] consent."' 149 Its purpose is to "promote the progress of
science and useful arts" by allowing critical, 5 ° educational, 151 or
right Clause preclude statutory copyright in facts, and therefore offer no basis for preemption
of state protection of facts. ... ).
145. See Schuchart & Assoc., Professional Eng'rs, Inc. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp.
928, 943-44 (W.D. Tex. 1982) (setting out elements of misappropriation claim).
146. See id.
147. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982), states that "the fair use of a copy-
righted work. . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching...,
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright." The Act then lists four factors
to be considered in determining whether a use is "fair":
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
Id.
148. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 17, at 66.
149. Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966)
(quoting H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
150. See, eg., Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 554 (2d Cir. 1964) (parody
as a form of social and literary criticism held to be fair use; constitutional purpose of copy-
right means that the copyright holder's financial interests must be subordinated to the
"greater public interest in the development of art, science and industry"), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 822 (1964).
151. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982), quoted supra note 147.
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other socially beneficial uses of copyrighted works.'
Most of the compilation cases have dealt with historical works,
in which the public benefit asserted was the advancement of soci-
ety's understanding of history. 15 3 This social benefit comports with
those listed by the Act as examples of the uses that would be consid-
ered "fair." ' 4 In such cases, the expression taken by the subse-
quent compiler was typically the prior compiler's expression of the
facts themselves, as contrasted with the prior compiler's selection or
arrangement of materials. 155 However, the "public benefit" ration-
ale has been applied in at least one case involving the protection of a
compiler's selection or arrangement of preexisting materials.
In New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 5 6 the
plaintiff had created an index to the New York Times. The defend-
ant wished to create a further index showing the location of refer-
ences to personal names in the plaintiff's index. The nature of the
defendant's work required that the defendant copy the plaintiff's
work.157 The court assumed that the plaintiff's copyright covered
the use of the names indexed in its work,158 but nonetheless found
that the defendant's use of the plaintiff's index was fair.
The court believed that the defendant's profit motive for creat-
ing its index was overcome by its other purpose, namely, to save the
public the time and effort of going through every volume of the
plaintiff's index to find all references to a particular name.' 5 9 More-
over, the effect of the defendant's work on the plaintiff's market was
slight, and may even have been beneficial, since the defendant had
not copied the plantiff's listing of references to New York Times ar-
ticles (generally regarded as the most useful aspect of the plaintiff's
work). A meaningful use of the defendant's work therefore re-
152. The Act also lists news reporting and research as examples of the kinds of uses that
will be considered "fair." Id.
153. See, e.g., Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp.
130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
154. All of the "fair uses" listed by § 107 promote society's interest in the development or
dissemination of ideas, thus advancing first amendment concerns. Promoting the develop-
ment of historical knowledge similarly implies an interest in the development of ideas.
155. See, e.g., Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp.
130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
156. 434 F. Supp. 217 (D.N.J. 1977).
157. Id. at 220-21. The defendant had to copy the plaintiff's work so that he could make
page references to it, and collect all the variant spellings of names.




quired use of the plaintiff's work as well. 160 Because the defendant's
work would be beneficial to the public, and would not harm the
plaintiff's market, the court held that the defendant's use was
fair. 161
Despite the emphasis that the New York Times court placed
upon the public benefit of the defendant's work, it is the economic
harm to the plaintiff that typically has been the controlling factor in
fair use cases.1 62 In determining the economic harm to the work,
courts will consider both its original and its potential markets.1 63
In New York Times, if the plaintiff's copyright had covered the
names as indexed, the defendant's work would have caused eco-
nomic harm to the plaintiff by impairing its ability to market a de-
rivative index. Under the usual analysis, then, the defendant's use
would have been considered unfair.
In addition, the public benefit found in New York Times may
not be one of those intended to be promoted by the fair use defense.
The uses normally allowed by fair use obviously are intended to
help advance ideas, 164 and thus have strong first amendment impli-
cations. The essence of the New York Times decision was the pro-
motion of public convenience, arguably a less compelling interest
than the advancement of ideas. On the other hand, the court's deci-
sion might be interpreted as promoting the free dissemination of
information, which is a value protected by the first amendment.1 65
The interest in public access to information could be protected
more directly. Protection of a compiler's rights in his selection
and/or arrangement of preexisting materials might prevent others
from access to the information itself, particularly where the ar-
rangement is dictated by the nature of the materials. Such protec-
tion would be contrary to the constitutional mandate that the
copyright protect only "[w]ritings." 166 Therefore, a court might
hold that only exact copying of the selection and/or arrangement
160. Id. at 223-24.
161. Id. at 226.
162. See Goldwag, Copyright Infringement and the First Amendment, 29 COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. (ASCAP) 1, 19-24 (1983); Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. (ASCAP) 43, 62 (1955).
163. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1982), quoted supra note 147. Cf Taylor, supra note 80, at 67-
68 (courts are not generally agreed on effect of commercial dormancy of copyrighted work on
fair use defense; question whether future markets for the work should be considered); Cohen,
supra note 162, at 62-64.
164. See supra note 158.
165. For example, news reporting.
166. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 78, § 1.08[D].
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would be prohibited, to preserve the free availability of the
information.
Such an analysis has been used in other cases in which courts
have found that broad protection of an author's expression would
come too close to protecting his ideas. 6 ' The author's expression
was protected, but the scope of the protection was limited, to pre-
serve the free availability of the ideas.
D. Summary
Copyright is an improper means for protecting a compiler's la-
bor and expense in collecting his data, as copyright is intended to
protect expressions, not labor. Thus, even though a compilation is
protected by copyright, the scope of that protection does not en-
compass the preexisting works or information that the compiler
uses, because these are not his expressions.
However, a state law claim for misappropriation may be avail-
able to protect the compiler's interest in gaining the benefits from
his labors. Most courts have found that the misappropriation doc-
trine, as applied to protection of compilers' interests, is preempted
by the 1976 Act. Yet since the interest protected by the misappro-
priation doctrine is labor, rather than expression, preemption is not
a necessary conclusion, nor is it entirely consistent with the lan-
guage and history of the Act.
Even when the compiler's expression is being protected, that
protection must be limited to ensure that copyright is not used to
protect elements that are not expressions. One court has done this
through the fair use defense. Arguably, a better approach would
recognize that the protection of a compiler's expression may, in
some cases, come too close to protecting the information itself. In
such cases, the limits of protection should extend only as far as the
compiler's precise, expressive contribution to the work.
III. PROTECTION OF NONORIGINAL MATERIAL IN
DERIVATIVE WORKS
A derivative work usually contains three elements: first, those
that are copied from the preexisting work;' 6 ' second, those that are
necessary to transform the original work into the new form or me-
167. See, e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Honora Jewelry Co., 509 F.2d 64 (2d
Cir. 1974); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
168. For example, a direct quote from the dialogue of a novel in a movie version. Gold-
stein, supra note 2, at 243.
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dium;' 69 and third, those that are entirely original to the derivative
work. 7° If the derivative is unlicensed, the first element may in-
fringe upon the original author's right to reproduce his work, and
the second may infringe upon his right to create derivatives.
A. Originality in Derivative Works
A derivative author certainly can protect his adaptation or
transformation of a preexisting work through a license from its orig-
inal author. 7' But can he protect it through the copyright in the
derivative work, as an original element in itself?
Professor Nimmer has argued that there is nothing original in a
change of medium alone. The derivative author did not originate
either the medium or the underlying work; by adapting the underly-
ing work to the new medium, the derivative author simply repro-
duced the underlying work in the new medium. 172 Thus, granting
copyright protection to a derivative work only because it adapts a
preexisting work to a different form or medium would violate the
principle that copyright protects only original material.1 7 1
Nimmer's argument makes sense from an historical perspective.
Derivative works were once considered to be noninfringing. 174
Thus, the transformation of a work into a new form or medium was
believed to add an original, expressive element. As copyright ex-
panded to encompass derivative rights, though, the law has come to
recognize that an author's expression includes more than form; an
adaptation of a work to a different form or medium would now in-
fringe the author's right to protect his expression.
This correspondingly implies that the form of a work is not the
original, expressive element that entitles the work to protection. An
author has the exclusive right to transform his work into different
forms and media. Any rights that the derivative author acquires in
169. For example, translation of the sentence, "Jane was frightened," in a novel to an
actor's expression of fear in a movie version. Id. The translation might be done in a number
of ways; Jane might show her fear by widening her eyes, or by running, or by letting her
mouth gape open.
170. For example, adding scenes or dialogue in the movie version of a novel. Id.
These three elements overlap. The hypothetical novel, for instance, might say, "They
chatted pleasantly for a few minutes." The moviemaker wanting to recreate that scene would
have to make up new dialogue for it. The dialogue would be "necessary" to the transforma-
tion, but would also be "original."
171. See, eg., G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir.
1951).
172. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 78, § 2.08[C].
173. Id.
174. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
1984]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
his realization of the author's right must be derived from the au-
thor's right.
At the same time, Nimmer and other commentators have recog-
nized that protection of the author's right to transform his work
does not mean necessarily that the transformation cannot be origi-
nal.17 While there is no originality in a work which merely repro-
duces another, preexisting work in a new form or medium, the
derivative work may significantly change the underlying work in
adapting it to the new form or medium. These variations originated
with the derivative author, and therefore should be considered
original to his work under the traditional, minimal standard of
originality. 176
The court in Doran v. Sunset House Distribution Corp.,1" found
that the plaintiff's adaptation of Santa Claus to three-dimensional
plastic was original under that standard.' 78 Admittedly, all aspects
of the plaintiff's work except its three-dimensional and plastic ele-
ments were traditional, nonoriginal elements of the Santa Claus
character. 179 The court found that the defendant had copied the
three-dimensional and plastic elements from the plaintiff's work in
creating its Santa Claus figure, and therefore had infringed.180 Pro-
fessor Nimmer, however, has argued that the plaintiff in Doran
originated neither the character, the three-dimensional form, nor
the plastic medium. Thus, there was nothing original about the
plaintiff's work, and he should not have received protection.1 81
In L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder,"'2 the plaintiff made a
number of changes in adapting an antique mechanical toy bank to
plastic.183 The court found that, because the changes in the under-
lying work were necessary 184 to the adaptation and also substan-
tively trivial, they merely displayed physical skill, and so were not
175. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 78, § 2.08[C]; Goldstein, supra note 2, at 243.
176. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 78, § 2.08[C], at 2-99 to 2-100.
177. 197 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962).
178. Id. at 944.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 947-48.
181. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 78, § 2.08[C].
182. 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976).
183.
Appellant Snyder claims differences not only of size but also in a number of other
very minute details: the carpetbag shape of the plastic bank is smooth, the iron
bank rough; the metal bank bag is fatter at its base; the eagle on the front of the
platform in the metal bank is holding arrows in his talons while in the plastic bank





original."8 5 It feared that protection of such minute changes would
create too great a potential for harassment; the threat of suit for
infringement might drive other authors away from creating deriva-
tive works, even though they technically would not infringe if they
did not copy the prior derivative work. Thus, the first person to
adapt a work to a particular medium would have an effective
monopoly. 186
The potential for harassment, however, is an accepted cost of
having a minimal originality standard.'8 7 Copyright protection
would not bar others from doing their own adaptation of a preexist-
ing work; it would only bar them from copying a previous adapta-
tion. Furthermore, the prior derivative author would have to prove
that a subsequent derivative author copied his work. If the changes
made were obvious, the plaintiff's proof would be correspondingly
more difficult.
Protection of a derivative author's variations on a preexisting
work would not extend to the transformation itself. Nor would it
require protection for those changes essential to the transforma-
tion.18 8 Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp.'s9 illustrates the
harassment which may result from adopting an originality standard
which is too low. Walt Disney Productions authorized both Tomy
and Durham to create plastic wind-up toy versions of Disney char-
acters.' 90 Tomy claimed that Durham had copied its toy and there-
fore infringed its copyright. The court refused to recognize Tomy's
copyright, arguing that Tomy had done no more than change the
form in which the Disney character appeared.' 9' Like the court in
185. Id. at 491.
186. Id. at 492.
Professor Nimmer has argued that this rationale would lead to the "ludicrous result that
the first person to execute a public domain work of art in a different medium thereafter
obtains a monopoly on such work in such medium, at least as to those persons aware of the
first such effort." Such a result would not be correct, because the medium itself is not an
original element. I M. NIMMER, supra note 78, § 2.08 [C], at 2-99 to 2-100.
187. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 243.
188. Changes essential to the transformation are those which must be made and in only
one way. "To grant protection [when the possible permutations of expression are few] would
permit appropriation of the subject matter." A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 32 (5th ed.
1979). Cf supra notes 107, 166-67 and accompanying text.
189. 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980).
190. Id. at 911.
191.
[Tihe mere reproduction of the Disney characters in plastic. . . does not constitute
originality as this Court has defined the term. Tomy has demonstrated, and the
toys themselves reflect, no independent creation, no distinguishable variation from
preexisting works, nothing recognizably the author's own contribution that sets
Tomy's figures apart from the prototypical [Disney characters]. ...
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Batlin, it stated that, if given protection, Tomy could harass subse-
quent derivative authors, and thus interfere with Disney's right to
license derivative works.1
92
The court understated the problem. Unlike the plaintiff's work
in Batlin, there was no indication that Tomy had contributed any-
thing original to the Disney characters in adapting them to the new
form. 193 Rather, it reproduced the characters in the new form, and
therefore did not create an original derivative work apart from the
Disney character. Thus, while Tomy might have been able to pro-
tect its transformation through a license from Disney, it should not
have been able to do so through a separate copyright interest.
B. Summary
The right to create derivative works was given to the original
author to encourage him to create and publish his work. Separate
protection of the derivative author merely because he reproduced
the original work in a new form or medium would detract from this
incentive. The subsequent author who transforms the work ac-
quires the right to do so from the author of the underlying work,
and has done nothing original vis-A-vis the work, the medium, or
the form with which he works.
However, the originality standard should ensure that copyright
protection is available for any changes that the derivative author
makes beyond a mere change in form or medium. Even if some
changes were necessary to transform the work, the derivative au-
thor had to exercise judgment in determining the particular changes
that would be made. Thus, the changes originated with the deriva-
tive author and were not copied. To maintain the minimal original-
ity standard, such changes must be considered original.
IV. CONCLUSION
Derivative works and compilations can be described broadly as
containing both preexisting and original materials.' 94 There is,
however, an area of overlap, in which both kinds of materials are
present. Whether the copyright in the derivative work or compila-
tion can protect the overlapping elements turns on the question
Id. at 910.
192. Id. at 910-11.
193. Id. at 910, quoted supra note 191.
194. See supra notes 1-2.
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whether these elements can be considered to be the original expres-
sion of the derivative author or compiler.
Research is one area in which preexisting and original materials
overlap. 195 The materials discovered by the researcher existed
before the researcher discovered them, and so they are not original
to him. However, the researcher may have expended a great deal of
time and effort in collecting the materials, and in that sense, the
research is original. In the context of copyright, research is not an
expression; it is only labor.'9 6 Thus, even though certain policies
would indicate that research should be protected, copyright is not
the proper means. A state law claim for misappropriation is better
suited to provide protection in this area. Even when a compiler's
expression, i.e., his selection and arrangement of the preexisting
materials, is being protected, that protection should be limited to
ensure that copyright is not used to protect the preexisting material
itself.
The transformation of a work to a new form or medium also
raises questions about the protection of overlapping materials or
rights. The author of the preexisting work has the right to trans-
form his work to different forms and media.197 Yet, a derivative
author who prepares a transformation of the original work to a dif-
ferent form or medium may exercise judgment and effort which
meets the originality standard's "origination" requirement.' 98 Such
an author should be protected to the extent of his contribution. The
author's right to transform or adapt his work, however, indicates
that the form or medium in itself cannot be considered original. A
derivative author who reproduces a work in a new form or medium
only can protect what his license from the original author gives him
authorization to do.
CHRISTINE WALLACE
195. See supra notes 109-17.
196. See supra notes 118-26.
197. See supra notes 172-74.
198. See supra notes 175-76.
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